Pemerintah Cari Solusi bagi Penambang Emas Ilegal? Jatam: Tetap Kejar Aktor Intelektual

Jakarta – Environmental law enforcement in Indonesia remains under intense scrutiny as civil society organizations condemn a controversial government proposal to transition illegal gold miners into the supply chain of the national Free Nutritious Meal (Makan Bergizi Gratis / MBG) program. Critics argue that the initiative sets a dangerous precedent, rewarding criminal behavior and undermining decades of regulatory efforts to curb rampant environmental degradation.

The debate highlights a deeper systemic crisis within Indonesia’s natural resource governance: a heavy reliance on administrative warnings over criminal prosecution, persistent political interference, and an enforcement framework that routinely fails to target the intellectual masterminds behind lucrative illegal mining syndicates.

Main Facts: The Controversial "Barter" Policy

The controversy erupted following statements by Rilke Jeffri Huwae, the Director General of Law Enforcement at the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (Gakkum KESDM). Huwae announced that the ministry is designing a pilot project aimed at shifting illegal miners away from mining activities and into the agricultural and livestock sectors. The produce generated by these former miners would then be funneled directly into the MBG program within their respective regions.

According to Huwae, the initiative stems from the recognition that many individuals engage in Pertambangan Tanpa Izin (PETI)—unauthorized mining—solely as a means of survival. He argued that the state has historically focused too heavily on punitive actions without providing viable economic alternatives, causing communities to return to illegal mining as soon as law enforcement officers depart.

"If we just chase them away, how long can law enforcement officers guard those locations? Not long," Huwae remarked recently.

The pilot project is initially slated for deployment among miners operating around the Agincourt Resources Martabe Gold Mine in North Sumatra, involving a collaborative effort between local governments, private corporations, and the central government.

For illegal miners physically unable to transition to agriculture—such as miners in Manado suffering from severe mercury poisoning—Gakkum KESDM plans to encourage holders of official Mining Business Licenses (IUP) to allocate specific zones. Under this scheme, illegal miners would operate under corporate environmental oversight and legal frameworks, a mechanism Huwae describes as providing "better economic choices."

Chronology and Context: The Escalation of PETI and Policy Shifts

The emergence of the MBG integration proposal follows years of escalating friction between local communities, enforcement agencies, and environmental advocates over unauthorized mining operations inside Indonesia’s protected forests and conservation areas.

• The Baseline Reality: Government data reveals that there are currently over 1,063 illegal mining sites operating within state forest zones alone, resulting in a staggering potential state loss of up to IDR 300 trillion.
• The Enforcement Stalemate: For years, sporadic crackdowns by security forces have yielded temporary shutdowns followed by rapid re-entries by miners who lack alternative livelihoods.
• The New Nexus: With the rollout of the high-profile national MBG program, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources sought to intersect social welfare policy with environmental intervention, culminating in the controversial pilot project announced in early 2026. This move immediately triggered sharp pushback from legal experts and conservation watchdogs.

Supporting Data: Administrative Sanctions vs. Criminal Prosecution

Beyond the controversy of alternative livelihoods, environmental law experts have raised red flags regarding the government’s shifting reliance on administrative remedies rather than criminal litigation.

Data from the Directorate General of Forestry Law Enforcement for 2026 indicates that authorities issued 101 administrative sanctions compared to only 61 criminal cases reaching the P21 stage (complete case dossiers). Similarly, Ministry of Environment (KLH) data from 2025 shows that only 15 environmental cases entered the criminal court system, with seven cases stalling at the P19 stage (returned to police for further investigation) and seven successfully reaching P21.

Rizal Irawan, Deputy for Security, Law Enforcement, and Environmental Recovery at the KLH, defended the use of flexible, multi-door instruments—combining administrative sanctions, civil environmental disputes, and criminal law. He emphasized that administrative penalties, including environmental permit revocations and financial fines, constitute legitimate enforcement. According to Irawan, administrative fines have successfully contributed IDR 1.6 billion to state non-tax revenues.

However, critics argue these figures mask a systemic weakness in deterring major corporate and syndicated environmental crimes.

Official Responses and Expert Critiques

The Moral Hazard of Government Incentives

Muhammad Jamil, Head of the Legal and Advocacy Division at the Mining Advocacy Network (Jatam), issued a scathing critique of the government’s plan. He stressed that unauthorized mining is explicitly categorized as a criminal offense under Articles 35 and 158 of Law No. 3/2020 on Mineral and Coal Mining, carrying penalties of up to five years in prison and a fine of IDR 100 billion.

While acknowledging that alternative employment is necessary for individuals wishing to exit illegal mining, Jamil argued that vocational transition must not erase criminal accountability. More dangerously, he warned that integrating illegal miners directly into state-sponsored supply chains creates a profound moral hazard.

"If the formula is ‘mine illegally first, and when the state needs suppliers we will accommodate you,’ then the message sent by the state is extremely dangerous: breaking the law can actually be a pathway to government facilities," Jamil stated.

Jamil asserted that true enforcement success should not be measured by how many miners become farmers or livestock breeders, but by how many illegal mining networks are permanently dismantled, illicit profits tracked, and ruined ecosystems restored.

The Illusion of Financial Deterrence

Laode M. Syarif, Vice Chairman of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) for the 2015–2019 period, underscored the severe limitations of administrative fines in environmental cases. Pointing to the mining sector, Syarif noted that even when courts or ministries impose trillion-rupiah administrative fines, these penalties merely extract capital from offenders without halting the underlying illegal extraction activities.

Syarif highlighted that natural resource governance in Indonesia remains severely hindered by corruption. He pointed to the country’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which stagnated at a low score of 34 out of 100 between 2023 and 2025.

Furthermore, Syarif emphasized that environmental law enforcement is vastly more complex than standard white-collar crime due to intense political interference and external pressures.
"Environmental law enforcement faces countless ghosts coming from all directions. That in itself is the ultimate challenge," Syarif noted.

Implications: The Need for Holistic Reform

The debate surrounding the conversion of illegal miners into MBG program suppliers lays bare a fundamental fracture in Indonesia’s environmental governance strategy.

1. Failure to Target Intellectual Actors: By focusing heavily on ground-level operators while neglecting the financial backers, equipment suppliers, middlemen, and buyers who form the backbone of PETI networks, the state risks merely displacing workers rather than dismantling criminal enterprises.
2. Erosion of Deterrence: Relying on administrative fines and offering institutional integration to lawbreakers threatens to normalize environmental crimes, transforming illegal extraction into a calculated risk with a potential state-backed safety net.
3. The Imperative of Multi-Door Reform: Legal experts maintain that social transition programs must run strictly parallel to—not as a substitute for—rigorous criminal investigations. Without prosecuting syndicate masterminds, recovering massive ecological losses, and insulating enforcement agencies from political capture, initiatives like the MBG miner-conversion project risk institutionalizing the very lawlessness they aim to resolve.